

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

*The Foreign Policy
of the
Third Reich*

March 28, 1934
Vol. X, No. 2

25¢
a copy

Published Fortnightly
by the

\$5.00
a year

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
INCORPORATED

EIGHTEEN EAST FORTY-FIRST STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE THIRD REICH

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

INTRODUCTION

THE immediate object of National Socialist foreign policy is the attainment of equality—in armaments and status—and reestablishment of the Reich as a great power. The Nazis believe that as a consequence of the war and the Versailles Treaty, the world has reduced the Germans to the position of a second-class people, and their policy is concentrated on wiping this blot from the German scutcheon. The foreign political goal as set forth both in the National Socialist party's official program and in Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf*—which has become the bible of the Third Reich¹—is the union of all Germans in one great Germany.² Hitler placed special emphasis, moreover, on the acquisition of new territory in Europe on which Germans might settle and which would insure freedom of existence to the German people. In order to attain this end, the Reich, he said, must have military allies, for “an alliance whose aim is not war is senseless.” No state, however, would want to ally itself with present-day Germany, which can give no military help; hence the immediate object of German foreign policy must be transformation of the nation into a strongly armed military state. “Oppressed peoples,” wrote Hitler, “are never freed and unified in a common empire by means of flaming protests, but through a sharp, unsheathed sword. The forging of this sword is the task of the leaders of a people's domestic policy; the consummation of this work of forging the sword and the securing of military allies is the task of the leaders of its foreign policy.” Hitler envisaged Italy and Great Britain as the two future allies of the Reich. The French, he declared, will remain the “inexorable, deadly enemy of the German people.” Germany must turn its eyes toward the East, for only in Russia and the Baltic can

the Reich secure the new territory which will rectify “the false relation between our people and our land,” and thus “free the Germans forever from the danger of disappearing from the earth or of becoming a slave people.”

“We National Socialists,” stated Hitler, “consciously draw a line through pre-war German foreign policy. We begin anew at the place where history stopped short 600 years ago. We will end the continual migration of Germans to the south and west of Europe and turn our eyes to the land in the East. We will finally end the pre-war era and pass over to the land policy (*Bodenpolitik*) of the future. And when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we can only think first of all of Russia and of the Russian border states.”³

This Eastern policy was also stressed by Alfred Rosenberg, now head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Socialist party and cultural dictator of the Reich. Rosenberg, who was born in Estonia and educated in Tsarist Russia, strongly advocated a Nordic Europe with a German *Mitteleuropa* as the foreign political solution of the future.⁴ Russia, according to Rosenberg, must be pushed back into Asia, and then Germany will be able

“... to procure sufficient territory for its future 150 million inhabitants . . . In this great battle for existence of the future—a struggle for honor, freedom and bread—a creative nation such as Germany can have no consideration for impotent, worthless and presumptuous Poles, Czechs, etc. These people must be forced eastward in order to free territory for German peasants to cultivate. Only thus can there be the possibility for the German people to breathe again . . . Thus also will the foundation of a new cultural epoch for the white race be made possible.”⁵

These and many other statements of Nazi foreign political philosophy and aims before the party assumed power form a striking contrast to Hitler's speeches on foreign policy since he became Chancellor of the Reich—in which he has attempted to reassure the world that Nazi Germany desires only “work and peace.”

1. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1930). For sections dealing with foreign policy, cf. p. 684 et seq. According to the official *Voellkischer Beobachter* of September 27, 1933, the publishers have sold more than one million copies.

2. The Nazi racial theories which have found expression in the persecution of the Jews form part of this program of racial penetration and imperialism. Cf. Mildred S. Wertheimer, “The Jews in the Third Reich,” *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 11, 1933.

3. *Mein Kampf*, cited, p. 742.

4. Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, Hohenheim Verlag, 1930), p. 601 et seq.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 635.

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOL. X, No. 2, MARCH 28, 1934

Published by-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, 18 East 41st Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A. RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, President; WILLIAM T. STONE, Vice President and Washington representative; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; HELEN TERRY, Assistant Editor. Research Associates: T. A. BISSON, VERA MICHELES DEAN, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, MAXWELL S. STEWART, CHARLES A. THOMSON, M. S. WERTHEIMER, JOHN C. DEWILDE. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 a year; to F. P. A. members \$3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

PEACE POLICY OF NAZI GERMANY

In his first speech dealing with foreign policy, delivered at a special session of the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, the Nazi leader charged that the Versailles Treaty was designed to perpetuate "the disqualification of a great people to a second-class nation." Nevertheless, Hitler renounced all thought of war to achieve revision of the treaty. War, he declared, would be madness, would only open the way to new suffering and misery and would end by plunging Europe into "Communist chaos." "It is the deeply earnest desire of the national government of the German Reich," said Hitler, "to prevent such a development by frank and active co-operation." To this end, he pledged peace and friendship to other peoples and recognized their national rights, disclaiming as entirely foreign to Nazi philosophy all desire to "Germanize" foreign peoples. As evidence of the Reich's peaceful intentions, Hitler cited its complete disarmament, demilitarization of the Rhineland and execution of the Versailles Treaty. He categorically denied the charge that the Nazi Storm Troops have any connection with the *Reichswehr*, and insisted that they are not militarized and cannot be counted as trained reserves. Finally, Hitler demanded equality for the Reich with the other great powers and fulfillment by the latter of their promise to disarm. He insisted that Germany is entitled to security, and declared that it "is ready at any time to give up offensive arms if the rest of the world does likewise. The Reich is ready to become a party to every solemn non-aggression pact, for Germany is not thinking of aggression but of its security."⁶

Even after the German government had withdrawn from both the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933, Hitler and other Nazi leaders continued to sound the same note. The essence of all their speeches can be described as an unqualified demand for German equality—*Gleichberechtigung*—as promised in the Versailles Treaty, and steadfast determination to recover Germany's position as a great power. Simultaneously with its resignation from the Geneva organizations, the Hitler government had announced that it would appeal to the German people in a plebiscite on November 12 for confirmation of this action. The campaign which preceded this plebiscite on foreign policy stressed the German desire for peace. The election slogans were: "Peace with honor"; "Germans, fight with Adolf Hitler for peace, freedom and

bread"; "We will not be a people with inferior rights"; "Never again a treaty which disgraces our honor"; "Hitler's battle is the battle for the true peace of the world"; "With Hitler against the armament madness of the world"; "With Hitler for a peace of honor and equality."⁷

FOREIGN POLICY PLEBISCITE NOVEMBER 1933

At the polls on November 12, 1933, the German people were presented with the manifesto issued by the government on October 14 and reproduced as an integral part of the ballot. In voting "yes," the Germans thus declared their support of the entire statement:

"The German government and the German people are united in the will to pursue a policy of peace, reconciliation and understanding as the foundation for all decisions and all negotiations.

"The German government and the German people therefore regard force as an unsuitable means of settling existing differences within the European community of states.

"The German government and the German people renew the assurance of their readiness to destroy the last German machine gun and to discharge the last man from the army as long as the other peoples decide to do the same.

"The German government and the German people pledge themselves to seek the examination and solution of all pending questions by calm negotiations. They do this in the sincere hope of finally re-establishing a genuine friendly relationship with the other nations, including all former opponents and in order to do away with the war psychosis.

"The German government and the German people therefore declare themselves ready at any time by the conclusion of a continental non-aggression pact, to insure the peace of Europe for the longest possible time and thus to contribute to economic welfare and to general cultural reconstruction.

"The German government and the German people in their common conception of honor, are convinced that the conceding of German equality comprises an indispensable moral and actual condition *sine qua non* for any participation of our people and our government in international organizations or treaties.

"The German government and the German people are therefore at one in the decision to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and the League until this real equality is no longer withheld from our people.

"The German government and the German people are determined rather to undergo any misery, any persecution and any hardship than to sign a future treaty which would be unacceptable to any honorable person and to any honor-loving people, and whose terms would only add to the perpetuation of the need and suffering brought about by the Versailles system and thus lead to the collapse of the civilized community of states.

"The German government and the German people have no desire to participate in any armament race with other nations; they merely demand that share of security which will guarantee quiet and the freedom of peaceful work to

6. *Das junge Deutschland will Arbeit und Frieden, Reden des Reichskanzlers Adolf Hitler, des neuen Deutschlands Führer, mit einem Vorwort von Dr. Joseph Goebbels* (Berlin, Liebherr und Thiesen, 1933); English text in J. K. Pollock and H. J. Heneman, *The Hitler Decrees* (Ann Arbor, George Wahr, 1934).

7. *Voellischer Beobachter*, November 12, 1933.

the nation. The German government and the German people are determined to secure these just demands of the German nation by negotiation and through treaties.

"The government asks the German people these questions:

"Does the German people support the policies of its government outlined above and is it ready to declare that the policies express its own view and its own will and solemnly to support them?"⁸

More than 90 per cent of the German people went to the polls on November 12, 1933 and voted "yes" in answer to these questions—apparently an overwhelming testimonial to the peaceful intentions and aspirations of Nazi Germany. There is no doubt that Hitler sincerely desires peace at any price, at least while his régime is occupied in consolidating its power at home. In addition to making peace protestations, he has offered his neighbors non-aggression pacts, and in his internationally broadcast radio speech delivered on the day that Germany left Geneva he extended an olive branch to France. Speaking of the fact that both nations had so often poured out their best young blood on the battlefield, he continued:

"I speak in the name of the entire German people when I solemnly declare that we are imbued with the sincere wish to wipe out an enmity that . . . is out of all proportion to any possible gain . . . The history of the last 150 years ought to have taught both peoples one thing, namely, that essential changes of lasting duration are no longer possible no matter how much blood is sacrificed . . . It would be a tremendous event for all of humanity if the two peoples could once for all bar force from their common life.

"The German people are ready for this. While we frankly claim the rights granted to us by the treaty itself, I will say just as frankly that, beyond this, there are no more territorial conflicts as far as Germany is concerned. After the return of the Saar to the Reich only a madman could believe in the possibility of war between the two states—for which, as we see it, no moral or reasonably justifiable ground exists. Nobody can wish that millions of young lives be annihilated for the sake of a boundary correction of doubtful extent and of doubtful value."

Hitler then endeavored to reassure the French by stating that the demonstrations and marching of the Storm Troops were not

directed against France but were designed "to evince that political determination . . . which was necessary to overthrow Communism and which will be necessary to hold it down . . . There exists for National Socialist organizations but one enemy, and that is Communism."⁹

POLISH-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

In accordance with its peace policy, the Reich concluded a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland on January 26, 1934. This agreement specifically outlaws war between Germany and Poland and defines more precisely the obligations of the Anti-War Pact. The two parties, stating that lasting peace between them is a prerequisite to general peace in Europe, guarantee each other against armed attack. They further declare that the "international obligations assumed by them toward another party do not hinder the peaceful development of their mutual relations, do not contradict the present declaration and, through this declaration, are not affected." The agreement does not concern domestic questions, but the two signatories pledge themselves to peaceful settlement of all disputes, "if necessary by applying the machinery provided by other agreements in force between them"—apparently a reaffirmation of the Locarno Polish-German Compulsory Arbitration Convention.¹⁰ While the Nazis, before they came to power, reiterated that the Eastern frontiers must be altered, the signature of the non-aggression pact seems to postpone for at least ten years the danger of armed conflict over the Polish Corridor or Upper Silesia. Whatever may have been Hitler's motives in signing the German-Polish pact—whether to gain time for a settlement of the Austrian and Saar questions and the rearmament of the Reich, or as a sincere earnest of pacific policy—this pact seems to have temporarily relieved tension in one of Europe's danger spots. On March 7, 1934, moreover, Poland and Germany signed a commercial protocol which put an end to the tariff war existing between the two states since 1925.¹¹

THE "NAZIFICATION" POLICY

Opinion is divided as to the sincerity of Hitler's motives in renouncing for ten years revision of the hotly contested German Eastern frontier. Whether or not this move constitutes a break in the French alliance system, the Nazi leader has gained time to consolidate his power at home while proceeding with the Nazification of Germans beyond the borders of the Reich—a major objective of National Socialist foreign policy.

Despite statements of Hitlerite leaders that National Socialism is not an "article for export,"¹² the German government has lent its aid to Nazi movements in Danzig, the Saar and Austria.

10. For text of accord, cf. *Le Temps*, January 28, 1934. The pact went into force on February 26, 1934, after exchange of ratifications in Warsaw. On the same day a further agreement was reached between German and Polish officials under which a common effort will be made to prevent the appearance of comments unfavorable to either country in books, press, cinema, radio and theatre. Cf. *Voelkischer Beobachter*, February 27, 1934.

11. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 8, 1934.

12. Cf. declaration of Dr. Goebbels in Geneva on September 28, 1933. *Voelkischer Beobachter*, September 30, 1933.

8. Translated from *Voelkischer Beobachter*, November 12, 1933.

9. *Voelkischer Beobachter*, October 16, 1933.

FREE CITY OF DANZIG

Elections held on May 28, 1933 in the Free City of Danzig resulted in a decisive victory for the Hitlerites. A new government was formed and Dr. Hermann Rauschning, Nazi leader in the Free City, became president of the Danzig Senate after he had conferred with Chancellor Hitler in Berlin.¹³ Competent observers report that since then Danzig has been completely Nazified, although still maintaining its nominal independence as a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations.¹⁴

Far from creating increased friction, however, Nazi Danzig has improved its relations with Poland. A Danzig-Polish protocol concerning the use of the port of Danzig and ending the controversy between Danzig and the new Polish port of Gdynia was signed in Warsaw on September 18, 1933. Under the terms of this settlement, Poland has agreed to direct 45 per cent of its annual imports and exports passing by way of the Baltic through Danzig, and the remaining 55 per cent through Gdynia. Enforcement of the agreement is to be supervised by a mixed Polish-Danzig Commission.¹⁵ The Danzig-Polish accord was negotiated directly between the two signatories, without reference to the League of Nations which is responsible for the administration of Danzig.¹⁶

THE SAAR BASIN

Hitler's Nazification policy abroad, which has apparently succeeded in Danzig, has also been applied to the Saar Basin.¹⁷ This territory was detached from Germany by the Versailles Treaty, declared a politically autonomous area, and placed under the aegis of a Governing Commission appointed by the League Council. The Saar has been included in the French customs' régime, and the coal mines which form the most important asset of the basin were handed over to France. The final status of the Saar is to be determined after January 10, 1935,¹⁸ when its inhabitants are to decide in a

plebiscite whether they wish (1) to be reunited with Germany, (2) to be annexed by France, or (3) to continue under the present League régime.¹⁹

Hitler has several times proposed to France that the fate of the Saar be settled directly between France and Germany, without waiting for the plebiscite. In his speech on October 14, 1933, after Germany's withdrawal from Geneva, he stated that the Saar was the only territorial conflict outstanding between the two nations,²⁰ and in the course of subsequent Franco-German disarmament conversations, he again proposed an immediate settlement.²¹ On January 30, 1934, in his anniversary speech, Hitler was even more specific, declaring that he had proposed immediate settlement of the Saar question: "as soon as this issue is settled, the German government will be ready and resolved to assent truly and sincerely to the formal provisions of the Locarno Pact because then, in the German government's opinion, there will be no territorial question left between France and Germany." Hitler further pointed out that the plebiscite would doubtless result "in an enormous majority in favor of Germany," but that the Reich government feared that preparations for the voting would be accompanied by "renewed incitement of national passions. We would, for the sake of conciliation, much prefer it if, without a final plebiscite, there could have been found a solution equally satisfactory to both countries."²²

The French, however, take the view that the Saar is primarily an international problem, and can be regulated only by international action, thus precluding direct Franco-German negotiations to settle the question without a plebiscite. They also claim that the anti-Nazi elements in the Saar will vote for continuation of the League régime.²³

Before Hitler's advent to power, there seemed no doubt that more than 90 per cent of the Saar population would vote for reunion with the Reich. The population is composed preponderantly of workers and peasants, a large proportion of whom are Catholics. In the elections to the local *Landesrat* held in March 1932, the Catholic Center party elected 14 deputies out of a

13. Cf. Shepard Stone, "German-Polish Disputes: Danzig, the Polish Corridor and East Prussia," *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 5, 1933.

14. Robert Machray, "The Nazi Threat to Eastern Europe," *Current History*, December 1933; Pamphlet (Paris), January 26, 1934.

15. *Current History*, November 1933, p. 236; *Polish Press Information Bulletin*, issued by the Polish Press Information Service, November 1, 1933; Stone, "German-Polish Disputes," cited.

16. Danzig's foreign relations, however, are under Polish control.

17. The Saar Basin comprises an area of 730 square miles, with a population of 800,000 which is wholly German-speaking.

18. The exact date will be fixed by the League Council.

19. For a detailed description of the history, ethnography, economic, political and strategic importance of the Saar, a full account of its administration under the League Governing Commission, as well as the preparations already taken for the 1935 plebiscite, cf. Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, with a Collection of Official Documents (2 Vols., Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), Vol. I, p. 411-441; Vol. II, p. 491-539.

20. Chancellor Hitler made the same statement on November 21, 1933 in an interview with a representative of the *Paris Matin*, Cf. p. 24.

21. *New York Times*, March 10, 1934.

22. *Address before the German Reichstag by Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Berlin, January 30, 1934* (Berlin, German Government Printing Office, 1934).

23. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, December 9, 1933, January 20, 1934. An opposite point of view, declaring that France should settle the Saar question with Germany directly, without waiting for the plebiscite was expressed in *Pamphlet*, cited, January 26, 1934. For pertinent provisions of the Versailles Treaty dealing with the Saar, cf. Section IV, Articles 45-50 and Annex; also, Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, cited.

total of 30, the Communists returned 8, the Social Democrats 3, and the Nazis 2, the remaining 3 seats going to two small bourgeois parties.²⁴ Since the Nazi revolution, however, many of the Saar workers have noted with dismay the wiping out of the Socialist, Communist, and Catholic Center parties and trade unions in the Reich, as well as the persecution of individual members of these groups. Consequently, as the time of the plebiscite approaches, tension in the Saar is increasing. In July 1933 the Saar Center party followed the example of the Reich Centrists and dissolved itself. Former members are reported for the most part to have joined the Nazi *Deutsche Front* in the Saar, the political organization affiliated with the Reich Nazi party. Recently, however, many Catholics are said to have seceded from this group.²⁵

The League Council and Nazi Propaganda

Even before July, the situation with regard to National Socialist propaganda in the Saar had become so serious that the Governing Commission asked the League Council at its May meeting to "affirm the principle that the rights of the officials of the Saar Territory will, in all circumstances, be safeguarded."²⁶ On May 27 the Council adopted a resolution to this effect. In December the Nazi *Deutsche Front* in the Saar addressed a memorandum to the Council accusing the Governing Commission and its president, Mr. G. G. Knox, of partiality in their decisions, and criticizing the decrees issued by the Commission during 1933 for the maintenance of public order. Mr. Knox answered these charges in a report to the Secretary-General of the League which was presented to the Council at its January 1934 meeting. In his report, Mr. Knox stated that Nazi terrorism in the Saar had increased, and that there was boycotting and persecution of Jews and "of persons not yet coordinated," citing a number of cases of illegal action on the part of Nazi headquarters. The report further declared that the Nazi party had "organized a disguised administration of the territory at the side of the legal government, issued manifestos direct to the Saar communal authorities, issued certificates declaring parcels to be duty free, and added its own visas to the regular police visas on identification cards." Documents recently seized at Nazi headquarters in Neuenkirchen were held to prove "the con-

tinued existence in a disguised form of the prohibited organizations of the party, such as S.A., S.S.²⁷ and motor corps, and a systematic continuation of military exercises by them." After denying the charge that preference had been given to Socialists and Communists, and pointing out that public meetings of all political parties had been prohibited, the report stated in conclusion that the Commission²⁸ was convinced that it need not regret nor mitigate any of its emergency laws. On the contrary, it "would be guilty of grave negligence of its duty to the League of Nations if it failed to report on a serious situation in the Saar which has only developed since the rise of the Nazi party."²⁹

The agenda of the League Council, which convened in Geneva on January 15, 1934, was headed by a discussion of the arrangements for the Saar plebiscite. In view of the difficulties of the situation as summarized in the *Governing Commission's report*, the Council, at the suggestion of France, decided to invite the German government to participate in its discussions, and a telegram was immediately dispatched to Berlin. The Reich government, on January 17, replied that "for reasons of principle it must decline to take part in the discussions."³⁰ The Council had meanwhile received a petition from a group of Saar trade unionists, farmers and business men, which declared that the Nazis were pursuing a policy of "unparalleled terrorism" in the Saar territory. At the same time, Max Braun, leader of the anti-Nazi *Deutsche Freiheitsfront* in the Saar, asked that the Council delay the plebiscite, on the ground that the terror made free and sincere voting impossible. The Saar Nazis, represented in Geneva by an important industrialist, claimed on the other hand that 90 per cent of the Saar population supported the *Deutsche Front*, although only 6 per cent were members of the party. On January 20 the Council decided that the plebiscite must be held in 1935, and appointed a committee of three, composed of representatives of Italy, Spain and Argentina, to prepare for it "in such a way as to secure the freedom, secrecy and trustworthiness of the voting." The Council's resolution particularly charged the committee to study "appropriate means of safeguarding the population against pressure of any kind and the execution of any threat likely to affect the trustworthiness of the voting."³¹

27. Storm Troops and Guard.

28. This report was approved by all members of the Governing Commission except the Saar representative.

29. A summary of the report is given in *The Times* (London), January 12, 1934. Official text not yet available.

30. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 18, 1934.

31. *The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, January 1934.

24. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, cited, Vol. I, p. 439.

25. *Bulletin of International News*, January 18, 1934.

26. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, July 1933, p. 835 et seq.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUSTRIA

Nazification of Danzig and the Saar concerns territory with indisputably German inhabitants, which before the Versailles Treaty formed an integral part of the Reich. The penetration of the Nazis in Austria, however, is an entirely different matter. Not only did Austria not form a part of the unified German Empire of 1871, but the union of Austria and Germany after the war was categorically prohibited by the Versailles and St. Germain Treaties.³² Nevertheless, union of Austria, which has 6,500,000 German-speaking inhabitants, with Germany is one of the primary aims of Nazi foreign policy. Hitler, himself an Austrian by birth, has always advocated *Anschluss*.³³ Before the Nazi revolution, there was a strong movement working for union in both countries. Following Hitler's advent to power, however, the *Anschluss* movement assumed a different character, the Austrian Social Democrats and many Christian Socialists bitterly opposing it. Meanwhile, the Nazis undertook to "coordinate" (*gleichschalten*) Austria by undermining and overthrowing the Christian Socialist government of Chancellor Dollfuss. Numerous acts of violence—shootings, intimidations, bomb outrages, arson and attempts on the lives of prominent persons—took place which, according to the Austrian authorities, were perpetrated by Nazis.³⁴ Nazi leaders in Austria were alleged to have received instructions from Germany ordering them to obstruct and break up all Christian Socialist meetings and political activities, and to institute a veritable reign of terror in Austria. On May 13 the Bavarian Minister of Justice, Dr. Hans Frank II, flew to Vienna for a visit. Upon his arrival he was informed by the police that his visit was "not considered very desirable"; in order to protect his personal safety he was not allowed to deliver any political speeches, and was shortly escorted to the frontier.³⁵ The Dollfuss government then enacted emergency measures forbidding Nazi uniforms, flags and insignia on Austrian territory. On June 1, the German government retaliated by imposing a prohibitive visa fee of 1,000 RM on German nationals going to Austria, thus dealing a severe blow to the Austrian tourist industry which was largely dependent on German visitors.³⁶

NAZI ACTIVITIES

Meanwhile Nazi propaganda and terrorist acts in Austria continued. On June 11, at Innsbruck, a Nazi attempt was made on the life of Dr. Steidle, a *Heimwehr* leader and member of the Tyrol provincial government.³⁷ The following day Dollfuss closed all the Brown Houses and Nazi offices in Austria and arrested several leading Hitlerites, including Herr Theo Habicht, Nazi "Inspector-General for Austria," and member of the German Reichstag who had been appointed press attaché of the German Legation in Vienna without the consent of the Austrian government. On June 13 the government decreed that no civil servant should remain a member of the National Socialist party. The arrest of Herr Habicht was countered by arrest of the Austrian press attaché in Berlin, Dr. Wasserbaeck, despite the fact that the latter had held his post for eight years and was entitled to diplomatic immunity.³⁸ On June 19, convinced by his reception at the London Economic Conference that the powers were at least morally sympathetic to Austria, Dollfuss outlawed the Nazi party. This move, while it clarified the situation to some extent, resulted in driving the National Socialist movement underground. An illegal organization was set up which, according to documents discovered and published by the Dollfuss government,³⁹ operated under direct orders from the Nazi Foreign Affairs Bureau in Berlin. The aim of the Nazi activities in Austria was said to be overthrow of the government, suppression of all opposition and assumption of complete control of the Austrian state. To this end, a Nazi spy system was established in Austria and the terror continued unabated. A legion composed of Austrian Nazis who had crossed the border into Germany was formed in Bavaria, and encamped near the Austrian frontier. The difficulties of sending and receiving confidential reports on the situation between Vienna and Berlin were overcome by making use of the couriers of the German Legation in Vienna. This fact was cited by the Dollfuss government as further proof of the Reich's implication in the continued Austrian disturbances.

"There can be no question that the National Socialist party in Austria, although formally (according to Austrian law) an independent entity, in actual fact and from the standpoint of the supreme leaders in Germany, is a group subordinate to the Reich party, which merely forms a part of the German National Socialist party under the leadership of Adolf Hitler . . ."⁴⁰

32. Cf. Mildred S. Wertheimer, "The Problem of an Austro-German Union," Foreign Policy Association, *Information Service*, December 9, 1927; Vera Micheles Dean, "Austria: the Paralysis of a Nation," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 4, 1933.

33. Cf. *Mein Kampf*, cited.

34. *Das Braunbuch: Hakenkreuz gegen Oesterreich*, Hrg. vom Bundeskanzleramt, Büro des Bundesministers für Sicherheitswesen (Vienna, Verlag der Oesterreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1933).

35. *The Economist* (London), May 20, 1933.

36. *Ibid.*, June 3, 1933.

37. *Das Braunbuch: Hakenkreuz gegen Oesterreich*, cited.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, p. 25 et seq.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

In general, relations between Germany and Austria during the last half of 1933 may be characterized as a virtual state of war.⁴¹ In July, airplanes began dropping Nazi propaganda leaflets on Austrian soil and the powerful Munich radio station broadcast speeches attacking the Dollfuss government and delivering Nazi propaganda. While the "air-raids" ceased after a time, the radio broadcasts continued with more or less effectiveness despite strong interference by Austrian radio stations. For a brief period during the autumn of 1933, Germany's withdrawal from Geneva and the subsequent campaign for the plebiscite on foreign policy seemed to divert German attention from Austria. After November, however, Nazi agitation in Austria increased—many bomb explosions were reported and the Dollfuss government charged that German Nazis were smuggling explosives and arms across the frontier.

VIENNA PROTESTS TO BERLIN

On January 17, 1934 the Austrian Minister in Berlin verbally charged the Nazis with interference in Austria's domestic affairs, demanded a definite pledge that the Reich respect Austrian independence and threatened an appeal to the League in case of a German refusal.⁴² The Reich government did not reply to this *démarche* until February 1, but Chancellor Hitler in his anniversary speech of January 30 referred to the situation. Declaring that he regretted the existing unsatisfactory relations between the two countries, Hitler denied that Germany "intended to do violence to the Austrian state." He added, however, that it was only natural that National Socialism should be "taken up by the German population of Austria owing to its intellectual and emotional kinship with the entire German race . . . If the present Austrian administration deems it necessary to suppress this movement by the use of extreme public measures, then this is most certainly its own business. But then it must also take personal responsibility for the consequences of its own policy and must answer for them."⁴³

The German note, transmitted on February 1, emphatically denied Austria's charges and expressed "lively surprise that the Austrian government should have repeatedly . . . suspected the Reich of threatening the independence of Austria."⁴⁴ Stating that the Reich was anxious to improve German-Austrian relations, the note also denied that the so-called Austrian legion harbored any aggressive designs of invading Austria, and

declared that Germany had had nothing to do with sending explosives and bombs to Austria. In regard to the radio propaganda campaign from Munich, the note stated that these broadcasts were directed to Germans in the Reich in order to inform them of developments in Austria. Finally, the note declared that the situation in Austria was entirely domestic in character and consequently not a proper subject for international negotiations. The Dollfuss government, in an official communiqué issued on February 2, stated that Germany had not adequately answered any of its charges, and that it would therefore be forced to proceed as conditions dictated.⁴⁵

On February 5 the Austrian Cabinet empowered Chancellor Dollfuss to carry Austria's case to the League of Nations and take any further steps which might be necessary to prosecute the appeal.⁴⁶ Reports from Vienna indicated that a 200-page memorandum setting forth the complete story of Nazi interference in Austria's affairs was being prepared by the Austrian authorities.⁴⁷ The Italian, French and British governments, moreover, were notified that they would receive advance copies of the appeal. Meanwhile, the international situation and the domestic difficulties of the Dollfuss government, which were at least in part a result of the international complications, made it impossible for Dollfuss to transmit the appeal to Geneva. The crisis in German-Austrian relations came to a head at an inopportune time for the other interested powers. Great Britain was preoccupied with the disarmament negotiations and unwilling to antagonize the Reich by taking a strong stand in the Austrian question. France, always an uncompromising opponent of Austro-German union, was in the throes of a serious domestic political crisis. Thus Italy appeared to be the only country on which Dollfuss could rely.⁴⁸ Italian support, however, was apparently dependent on the domestic situation in Austria.

ITALY AND THE DOMESTIC CRISIS

Ever since Hitler's accession to power, the Dollfuss government has been a bulwark against the Nazification of Austria. In his efforts to stem the tide of Austrian National Socialism, the diminutive Chancellor has been forced to carry on a three-cornered domestic struggle. He was actively backed only by his own party, the Christian Socialists—the conservative *Heimwehr* giving him but lukewarm support. The Social Democrats, the largest political group in

41. John Gunther, "Dollfuss and the Future of Austria," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1934.

42. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, January 25, February 3, 4, 1934.

43. Address before the German Reichstag by Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Berlin, January 30, 1934, cited.

44. Summary and excerpts from the German note in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 3, 1934.

45. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 3, 1934.

46. *New York Times*, February 6, 1934.

47. *Ibid.*, February 12, 1934.

48. The international implications of the Austrian problem will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of *Foreign Policy Reports*.

Austria and the most ardent opponents of the Nazis, who might have become Dollfuss' natural allies, were repeatedly rebuffed by the Chancellor. The Socialist *Schutzbund* had been dissolved in April 1933; the special financial privileges of the municipality of Vienna, a Socialist stronghold, had been curtailed, and the Socialist newspaper, the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, was subjected to strict censorship.⁴⁹ Nevertheless the Socialists, regarding Dollfuss as the lesser of two evils, continued to refrain from open opposition to him. Their position became steadily more untenable, however, especially after Dollfuss' announcement on September 11, 1933 of his plans for the establishment of a non-party state based on *Staendische*⁵⁰ foundations, with a strong authoritative leadership. At the same time, Dollfuss berated the "Marxists" for "leading and misleading" the people and declared that their time was over.

Meanwhile Dollfuss and Mussolini were apparently drawing closer together. The Austrian Chancellor had made several trips to Italy to confer with *Il Duce*, and the latter had expressed his unchangeable opposition to Austro-German union. It was reported, moreover, that Prince von Starhemberg, leader of the Austrian *Heimwehr* and an uncompromising foe of the Austrian Socialists, was also in close contact with Italy. The events of February 1934 which resulted in the complete suppression of the Austrian Socialists after several days of bloody civil war, must be viewed in the light of Italian Fascism's abhorrence of Socialism in Austria. Dollfuss' desire and necessity to secure help from abroad in order to maintain Austria's independence sealed the fate of Austrian social democracy.

FASCIST-SOCIALIST CIVIL WAR

The domestic situation came to a head while the Vienna Foreign Office was preparing Austria's appeal to the League of Nations against Nazi Germany. *Heimwehr* defections and negotiations between *Heimwehr* leaders and important Nazis had been reported for some time. Dollfuss, moreover, had apparently been led to believe that, in order to make sure of *Heimwehr* as well as Italian support, he must take energetic action against the Socialists and set up an Austrian Fascist state. During Dollfuss' visit to Budapest on February 9, Vice-Chancellor Fey, with his *Heimwehr* troops, raided Socialist centres and occupied the quarters of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*. On February 12 a *Heimwehr* raid on Socialist headquarters in Linz precipitated a general strike, and martial law was declared throughout the

country. A bloody civil war broke out between Socialists and Austrian Fascists, which took toll of a thousand or more lives; the Austrian Socialists did not allow themselves to be wiped out without resistance, as had their German comrades. Their fight against the *Heimwehr* and the police, however, ended in defeat; the Socialist party has been dissolved, its property seized, its leaders have been executed or are in jail except for some few who escaped across the frontier after the fighting was over.

The Nazis kept their peace during this struggle, expecting that Hitler would emerge as the final victor. Whether the Austrian workers will now turn to National Socialism as a result of the Dollfuss-*Heimwehr* policy, remains to be seen. That the German Nazis merely seemed to be awaiting a favorable opportunity for an anti-Dollfuss *Putsch* appeared indicated on February 19 by Herr Habicht, Nazi "Inspector-General for Austria." Broadcasting on the radio from Munich, Herr Habicht stated that the Nazis "offer to the Austrian government an eight-day armistice, from February 20 to 28, during which all party members will be forbidden, under pain of instant expulsion, to attack the Austrian government in any way whatever." During this period, the Dollfuss government was admonished that it must decide whether it would "continue the policy pursued hitherto" or whether it was prepared "to come together with the National Socialist movement in order to prepare for a happier future." In case the answer was in the negative, Habicht warned that "the fight will be resumed with all vigor on February 28."⁵¹

The Dollfuss government made no reply to this ultimatum. In the course of the following week Herr Habicht attempted to tone down his words, for in a further broadcast on February 25 he confined himself to showing the Austrian government the advantages which it would gain by giving the Nazis a share in running the country.⁵² The twenty-eighth of February passed without incident, and the Nazis continued quiescent. Habicht's relations with Hitler are reported to have become strained as a result of his ultimatum, but it is still not clear whether his speech was made with or without direct authorization from Berlin. In any case, the incident seemed definitely to prove Germany's complicity in the Austrian situation.

"THE UNION OF ALL GERMANS"

Thus Hitler is attempting to carry out the Nazi program of unification of all Germans by a policy of Nazification and penetration of neighboring peoples rather than

49. Gunther, *Dollfuss and the Future of Austria*, cited.

50. A state in which representation is given to professional and economic rather than political interests.

51. *New York Times*, February 20, 1934.

52. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1934.

annexation of territory. Growing Nazi movements in Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Holland, Denmark and Czechoslovakia offer further proof of the extent of these efforts, which have not improved the Reich's foreign relations. The Hitlerites, moreover, contend that their victory in Germany has given rise to a new doctrine which may have far-reaching repercussions on European minority problems. This is the theory of so-called "race allegiance" (*Bekenntnis zum Volkstum*), according to which the Third Reich has assumed the right of supervision and criticism of spiritual and political developments of German-speaking citizens in other states. This conception of ethnic nationality, which has found expression in anti-Semitic measures within Ger-

many,^{52a} is regarded by the Reich's neighbors as a move toward revision of the Versailles Treaty.⁵³ In a speech at Munich on March 19, 1934, Hitler declared: "The map of Germany has always changed It will continue to change until all the German peoples are unified."^{53a}

In the Baltic states, also, there has been evidence of attempted Nazification. It has been reported, furthermore, that Minister Goebbels had proposed a deal with Poland according to which Germany should have a free hand in Latvia and Estonia, and in return Poland should have a free hand in Lithuania and a portion of Latvia, which once formed part of the Polish Kingdom. Poland, however, declined to consider this proposal.^{53b}

THE DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

The Hitler government participated in the Disarmament Conference during the spring and summer of 1933 and accepted the British Draft Convention, introduced on March 16, as a basis for discussion.⁵⁴ The Conference had adjourned on June 8, 1933, and was scheduled to reconvene on October 16. Meanwhile its president, Mr. Arthur Henderson, had visited the various European capitals in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a common basis of agreement. Finally a series of conversations were held in late September and early October at Paris and Geneva between the British, French and Americans and later the Italians and Germans, with a view to bridging the gap between the French and German positions. From these discussions it was plain that France felt it impossible to agree to any measure of immediate reduction of its armaments before the establishment and prior functioning of a commission of control which would relieve France of what it regards as the menace of secret German rearmament—a fear which has been increased by the advent of Hitler. The French also insisted that there must first be general acceptance of the principle, embodied in the British Draft Convention, of transformation of European continental armies into conscript militias. Under this plan, the German *Reichswehr* would be replaced by a short-term militia twice as large as the present army. While it was understood that Germany would then be allowed types of arms not abolished by the Disarmament Convention, the French maintained that the Reich would have the right to manufacture these arms

only after the expiration of an initial probationary period. During this period, not only would the European army systems be transformed, but the control commissions would be functioning.⁵⁵

The Germans found these conditions unacceptable. Their position was authoritatively set forth in a *note verbale* of October 6, 1933, addressed by Foreign Minister von Neurath to Great Britain and Italy,⁵⁶ which apparently constituted the last detailed statement of the German objectives, non-fulfillment of which caused the Reich's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference. While accepting the British Draft as a basis, Germany refused to consent to the "probationary period." The Reich was willing, however, to undertake immediately the transformation of the *Reichswehr* into a short-term army. Furthermore, it offered some concessions in regard to arms which, according to the British Draft, are to be forbidden in future, but asked for application of the "principle of equality of rights," although apparently not expecting to achieve this goal immediately.

While these disarmament conversations were taking place, the Fourteenth Assembly of the League of Nations was in session at Geneva. The atmosphere in the Assembly was markedly anti-Nazi, and as the meetings progressed Germany's diplomatic isolation became increasingly apparent. This situation doubtless served to augment the growing dissatisfaction and impatience of the German government with the League, and thus influenced its decision to withdraw from Geneva.

52a. Cf. Wertheimer, "The Jews in the Third Reich," cited.

53. Cf. "The Nazis Outside Germany," *The Central European Observer*, October 13, 1934.

53a. *New York Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1934.

53b. *Ibid.*, November 18, 1933, January 14, 1934.

54. William T. Stone, "The Disarmament Crisis—1933," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 25, 1933.

55. Allen W. Dulles, "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1934.

56. There seems to have been no explanation as to why this *note verbale* was sent only to the British and Italians and not to the French, whom it primarily concerned. The text has been published in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, October 21, 1933, and reproduced in Dulles, "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," cited.

REFUSAL TO GRANT GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT

The great powers had meanwhile continued disarmament conversations preparatory to the reconvening of the Conference on October 16. The German position, as outlined in von Neurath's *note verbale* of October 6, had proved unacceptable to France because it provided for a measure of immediate German re-armament; the other powers opposed it on the same grounds. These preliminary conversations were further complicated by the sudden recall of the chief German delegate for consultation with his government in Berlin. Nevertheless, according to accounts of participants in the negotiations, "every effort was made to find a conciliatory basis which, without admitting Germany's claim for immediate re-armament, would permit the gradual realization of the equality of status on which Germany was insisting and leave the way open for negotiations on the points where the German thesis was not met."⁵⁷ The results of these efforts were embodied in a report presented to the Bureau of the Conference on October 14 by Sir John Simon, whose statement was supported by the delegates of the United States, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Greece.⁵⁸

Insistence on a Probationary Period

Sir John Simon summarized the conversations of the preceding weeks and then outlined the suggested plan of work for the forthcoming sessions of the plenary conference.⁵⁹ While the British Draft Convention was to remain as the general framework for the proposed arms agreement, it was to be recast in some respects. Instead of covering a period of five years, this interval was to be extended to eight years, during which a continuous program would be carried out

"... designed to secure at the end of the period two essential conditions:

"(a) A substantial measure of disarmament actually realized and completed on the part of the heavily armed powers, and

"(b) The achievement of the principle of equality in a régime of security which, ever since December of last year, has been the declared objective not only of the powers who signed the declaration of December 11⁶⁰ but of the Disarmament Conference itself."

In order to attain these ends, Sir John stated that it was necessary to proceed gradually,

57. Dulles, "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," cited.

58. For text of *Compte rendu officiel de la séance du bureau* (14 octobre 1933), cf. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, October 21, 1933.

59. Text in *Press Releases*, Department of State, October 14, 1933.

60. The declaration of December 11, 1932, stated that one of the principles that should guide the Conference should be the grant to Germany and the other disarmed powers of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations. It further pledged the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany to seek without delay to work out a convention effecting a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments. William T. Stone, "The World Disarmament Conference: Second Stage," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 18, 1933.

and pointed out that "the approach is manifestly influenced by the present unsettled state of Europe and the ensuing distrust, fears and alarms." Thus the projected eight-year scheme "would begin with the transformation of continental armies [into short-term conscript militias] . . . together with the setting up, through the medium of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of an adequate system of supervision so that the sense of security which the due observance of the convention will afford should provide the groundwork for the practical attainment of the two ideas of disarmament and equality." Moreover, the supervision contemplated "would be of general application" and its purpose would be "to insure that the undertakings contained in the convention were loyally observed." The length of the first period during which armies would be transformed and a "real feeling of confidence should develop" was tentatively fixed at four years or less. Sir John pointed out, however, that whatever the length of this trial period, the convention itself would have to include, when signed, a detailed scheme of general disarmament "to be attained by the time the convention expired." The British Foreign Secretary stressed the fact that his government could not support the convention unless "the degree of disarmament by the heavily armed powers is both fully defined in the convention and really adequate," and stated further that during the second period the "results of the abolition of various kinds of armaments⁶¹ and of the prohibition against their further use will be to constitute a common list of permitted arms which would become the same for all countries, and thus the differential position of the powers whose armaments were limited by the peace treaties would finally cease." Although this plan was designed to bring about eventual equality, Sir John stressed that "the powers now under restrictions of the peace treaties should not begin to increase their armaments forthwith, but should express their willingness to conform to a time-table," for no agreement could be reached on the basis of a convention providing "for any immediate re-armament" other than the proportional numerical increase which in the case of Germany would be required in view of the proposed doubling in the size of its army.

GERMANY WITHDRAWS FROM CONFERENCE

While this declaration of policy envisaged some definite plan for eventual reduction of arms on the part of the heavily armed powers, it failed to meet the German demand for the realization of immediate equality, con-

61. These included movable land guns over 6 inches in calibre, heavy tanks and gas; drastic reduction in the numbers of military aircraft and limitation on their size was also envisaged. Cf. Dulles, "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," cited; Stone, "The Disarmament Crisis—1933," cited.

tinued to insist on the retention of the "probationary period" which the Reich had stated categorically was unacceptable, and prohibited immediate German re-armament even as regards defensive weapons. On the same day, the Reich dispatched an official telegram to Geneva announcing its withdrawal from the Conference because "it is now clear that the Disarmament Conference will not fulfill what is its sole object—namely, general disarmament. It is also clear that this failure of the Conference is due solely to the unwillingness on the part of the highly armed States to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm. This renders impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognized claim to equality of rights, and the condition on which the German government agreed at the beginning of this year again to take part in the work of the Conference thus no longer exists."⁶²

It appears, then, that the Hitler government decided that the only way to achieve German equality and re-establish the Reich as a "great power" was to cut the Gordian knot and present the world with a definite choice: equality by means of German re-armament, or disarmament down to the German level by the heavily armed powers.

Following Germany's withdrawal from Geneva, considerable diplomatic activity has taken place behind the scenes in various European capitals. The only result of these negotiations appears to have been the postponement of the next session of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. Meanwhile, Hitler has made efforts to terminate the diplomatic isolation of the Reich. In an interview on November 21, 1933 with a representative of *Le Matin*, the Nazi Chancellor declared his willingness to "undertake negotiations with those who wish to talk to me." At the same time, however, he stated that the Reich would not return to Geneva.⁶³

GERMAN PROPOSALS TO FRANCE

On December 18, following several conversations with Hitler, the French Ambassador, M. François-Poncet, presented definite German proposals to his government. After stressing that Germany was the only state which had really fulfilled its disarmament obligations under the Versailles Treaty and stating that since the heavily armed powers had no intention of disarming, the Reich declared its right to obtain "in one manner or another," equality of treatment in so far as concerned its own security. It added, however, that if the other states actually disarmed it was ready "to disarm also, if necessary to the last can-

non and the last machine gun." The Reich then invited France to state its precise disarmament program. It insisted that Germany sought security by partial adjustment of its defensive armaments to the levels of those of its neighbors, but in such a way as to retain existing French superiority and avoid the danger of an arms' race. To this end, the Reich asked full equality and a pledge from the strongly armed states not to exceed their present level in armaments. Germany, moreover, offered to undertake voluntarily not to utilize its equality of rights in such a fashion as to lead any state to believe itself menaced by the Reich. Finally, it accepted uniform general supervision and suggested the conclusion of ten-year European non-aggression pacts.

After making these general proposals, the German note replied to specific questions which France had asked. The Reich contended that an army of 300,000 effectives was necessary for the defense of its long frontiers in view of the strength of its neighbors' armies. It also stated that transformation of the *Reichswehr* into a short-term army would require several years, and demanded defensive arms in a quantity corresponding to the normal defensive equipment of other modern defensive armies. The note declared, moreover, that transformation of the *Reichswehr* would not affect the nature of the Nazi Storm Troops. After describing this private army in some detail and stating that it numbered about 2,500,000 men between the ages of 18 and 60, the German government declared that the only mission of this body is to organize the German people so as to prevent for all time the return of the Communist peril. "On the persistence or disappearance of the danger of bolshevism will depend the eventual suppression of this system." The Reich offered, however, to permit the truth of these assertions to be examined by the future arms control organization. Furthermore, the German government stated that it was disposed to study the establishment of common rules for political associations and semi-military organizations in all countries.⁶⁴

FRANCO-GERMAN EXCHANGES

The French reply to these proposals was presented to Chancellor Hitler on January 1, 1934 in the form of an *aide-mémoire*.⁶⁵ While welcoming the German offer to conclude pacts of non-aggression and its acceptance in principle of "automatic and periodic supervision," the French government stated that it could not agree to the

62. *The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, October 1933, p. 210.

63. *New York Times*, November 22, 1933.

64. League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Conf. D. 166, Geneva, February 27, 1934.

65. Text in *Voelkerbund*, February 9, 1934; *L'Europe Nouvelle*, February 17, 1934.

Reich's demands for re-armament. It again pointed out that the figure of 300,000 men would be far from representing the total German military forces, and cited the police effectives and the semi-military organizations at the Reich's disposal, both of which would have to be taken into account in any convention for the limitation of armaments. Furthermore, the French reiterated that a convention based on the German proposals would "lead to a competition in armaments."

The *aide-mémoire*, however, set forth counter-proposals, although holding firm to the French demand for a probationary period during which international control would determine Germany's sincerity in fulfilling its share of disarmament. "France is prepared to accept a readjustment of the British plan involving, during the first years of the application of the convention, a reduction in the French effectives synchronised with the transformation of the existing German forces in such a manner that the two armies may be standardised on the type of a defensive army with short-term service and limited effectives, in order progressively to arrive at the parity of comparable French and German effectives, that is to say the effectives intended for the defense of the home territory." France, however, refused to accept reduction of material until the end of the probationary period of the convention, although agreeing to keep its armaments at their present level. It offered to consider a 50 per cent reduction of military airplanes, provided this was agreed to by the other principal air powers and was accompanied by effective control over civil aircraft and aircraft manufacture. Finally, the French government pointed out that the problems concerned were not Franco-German but European in scope, and declared that "France in order to remain faithful to the policy of international cooperation, cannot consider them apart from the various governments concerned and the League of Nations itself."

The French *aide-mémoire* was on the whole conciliatory and left the door open for further exchanges of views, although it could not be regarded as meeting any of the fundamental German demands. The German reply took the form of a memorandum presented on January 19, 1934, which was also friendly in tone although still flatly refusing to accept a probationary period before the introduction of general disarmament. Such a measure, the Reich contended, would merely prolong German insecurity, especially during the conversion of the *Reichswehr*. Furthermore, the French offer of an immediate 50 per cent reduction in its air-force was considered inadequate, since the Reich is allowed no military aviation

whatever, and thus "the proposed reduction of the air forces of the other States would in practice not make any change in the position of radical inequality and complete defenselessness of Germany in the air." In regard to supervision the note stated that "the question that remains decisive for Germany is whether the discrimination against it is to be prolonged for a further number of years. Can the other powers give any valid reason for such a plan, which is incompatible with the honor and security of Germany? The German government is fully convinced that this is quite out of the question."

Although reiterating its earnest desire for "general disarmament of as far-reaching a character as possible," the Reich declared that since the other powers showed no disposition to live up to their treaty obligations in this respect, Germany "cannot possibly be expected to take the consequences of this position entirely upon itself by continuing for years to be subject to one-sided armament limitations which do not apply to other States and are in no relation to their level of armaments." The note re-stated that a minimum of 300,000 men was required for German security under present conditions, calling attention to the heavy armaments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium as well as France and also to the "enormous numbers of trained reserves which these states possess." In this connection, the Reich government once more stressed the non-military character of the Storm Troops and declared its willingness to subject this point to international supervision provided the other countries "undertake the same obligation in respect to similar organizations which they possess."

In general the note stated that the main points dividing the two governments were computation of effectives and the time "when the German army will be equipped with defensive weapons." Rejection of the German demands on these points, the note declared, "could only mean that there is no desire to recognize Germany's equality of rights in fact." Finally, after reiterating the German offer to conclude non-aggression pacts, the note posed thirteen questions to France in regard to the latter's intentions concerning disarmament.

Direct Franco-German negotiations have thus come to an impasse. In an effort to break this deadlock, the British circulated a disarmament memorandum on January 29, 1934 which was followed two days later by an Italian communiqué on the question. Both the British and Italians favored increasing the German army to a maximum of 300,000 men and allowing the Reich some degree of re-armament. The British plan,

moreover, called for abolition of certain offensive weapons.⁶⁷

The British and Italian efforts apparently had no effect on the situation. On February 10, Foreign Minister Barthou of France addressed a letter to Mr. Arthur Henderson, president of the Disarmament Conference, once more summarizing the French attitude. France's refusal of the German offers was based primarily on the contention that the Nazi Storm Troops are incontestably military in character and possess real military

value. France was not prepared to admit, therefore, that the calculation of German effectives can be established without taking the Storm Troops into consideration. Furthermore, the French declined to accept any German re-armament, and reiterated the importance of guarantees in case of violation of a disarmament convention. Finally, France stated that "the acceleration of the rhythm according to which certain countries are pursuing their re-armament, in contravention of the terms of the treaties, demands a rapid solution . . ."⁶⁸

IS GERMANY RE-ARMING?

While disarmament negotiations are deadlocked, there appears to be some basis for the French contention that the Reich is engaged in re-armament and the militarization of German youth. This development is particularly noticeable in education. In the lower schools the teachers are told that "in every branch of learning there are four great principles which must govern all instruction: race, arms (*Wehr*), leadership, religion . . . Regard everything in relation to these four imperatives, and you will be surprised to discover that pacifist and similar trends of thought have disappeared."⁶⁹ In the colleges and universities the emphasis is the same. Chairs of a new Science of Arms (*Wehrwissenschaft*) have been established in all the important universities and colleges.⁷⁰ Furthermore, numerous books dealing with the subject have been published recently. The most notorious of these is the work of Ewald Banse, professor of *Wehrwissenschaft* at the Brunswick Technical College. Excerpts from this volume, entitled *Wehrwissenschaft, Eine Einführung in eine neue Wissenschaft*,⁷¹ were published abroad⁷² and aroused considerable comment. As a result, the book was banned by the Hitler government on October 20, 1933 with an official statement declaring that Professor Banse's ideas did not correspond to those of the German government and should be regarded merely as his private opinion.⁷³ Nevertheless, when Banse's book was first published late in 1932, the official Nazi organ,

Voelkischer Beobachter, reviewed it favorably.⁷⁴ Banse, moreover, still retains his post in Brunswick, and has recently published another book, *Geographie und Wehrwille*,⁷⁵ which reproduces all the important sections of the prohibited volume. Some conception of Banse's ideas may be gathered from the following quotation from his latest work:⁷⁶

"German education of this kind is struggle and war . . . because it gives youth the conviction that . . . only through war can the things most sacred to it be preserved and because youth is thus prepared always to offer its entire life, thought and work for these sacred possessions . . . which are territory, people [*Volkheit*], culture and security of the state."

German youth, however, is not confining itself to study of the science of war. One of the chief purposes of the official National Socialist Students' Association is the "education of the students for military service and for cooperation with the German people as a whole by means of military and labor service and physical exercises."⁷⁷ In all the colleges and universities, the students are organized under one supreme leader and have been placed under control of the Storm Troops.⁷⁸

A further obligation for German students is the voluntary labor service (*Freiwillige Arbeitsdienst*) which is carried out in camps organized by the Nazis as part of their drive against unemployment. It is estimated that there are some 250,000 men already enrolled in labor camps. These men work half a day and drill the other half, wear uniforms and are organized on regular military lines.

67. Notably large mobile land guns. Text of British and Italian memoranda in Conf. D. 166, February 27, 1934, cited.

68. *New York Times*, March 10, 1934. The visit of Captain Anthony Eden to Berlin, Rome and Paris, which took place between February 16 and March 1, apparently contributed nothing toward breaking the deadlock, for the French remain firm in their opposition to any German re-armament.

69. From a speech of the Reich leader of the National Socialist Teachers' Association, reprinted in *Reichszeitung der deutschen Erzieher*, *Nationalsozialistische Lehrerverzeitung*, edited by the Bavarian Minister of Education, Hans Schemm, November 1933.

70. Shepard Stone, "The Re-Arming of Germany," *Current History*, December 1933.

71. Leipzig, Armanen Verlag, 1933. An American edition of Banse's *Volk ohne Raum*, which was also banned by the Nazis, has recently appeared under the title, *Germany Prepares for War* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934).

72. *New York Times*, October 8, 1933.

73. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, October 21, 1933; *Voelkischer Beobachter*, No. 295, October 21, 1933.

74. *Voelkischer Beobachter*, No. 299, 1932.

75. Ewald Banse, *Geographie und Wehrwille, Gesammelte Studien zu den Problemen Landschaft und Mensch, Raum und Volk, Krieg und Wehr* (Breslau, Verlag W. Gottl. Korn, 1934).

76. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

77. From a decree issued on April 12, 1933 by the Prussian Ministry of Education. Official text in *Das Recht der nationalen Revolution*, No. V, *Neuordnung im Schulwesen und Hochschulwesen*, by Dr. Joachim Haupt (Berlin, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933).

78. By a decree of December 1, 1933, *Voelkischer Beobachter*. For typical internal university organization and student aims, cf. *Der Heidelberger Student*, supplement, 1933-34, No. 1. This is the official paper published by the Heidelberg students. Also *Der Tübinger Hochschulführer, Wintersemester 1933-34*, Hrsg. vom Tübinger Studentenwerk unter Mitwirkung der Studentenschaft (Tübingen, Verlag der Osianderschen Buchhandlung).

They are commanded by former army officers and subjected to rigid physical hardening. Part of this process consists in so-called *Geländesport* and *Wehrsport*, or terrain manoeuvres.⁷⁹

The Nazis are also using sport in general to further their ideal of a strong, military nation. They "regard sport as service to the people, just as formerly military training was service to the people."⁸⁰ Furthermore, they argue that physical training is the best means of instilling self-confidence in the people. The whole education of the nation's youth, they declare, "must be directed to inspiring the conviction that Germans are superior to all other peoples."⁸¹

PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

The Nazi party organizations—the Hitler Youth, the Storm Troops and guards—are the most important means of carrying out these ideals, and play somewhat the same part in the Third Reich as the equivalent organizations in Communist Russia and Fascist Italy. The Hitler Youth are divided into four parts: The Storm Youth (*Sturmjugend*) of boys between the ages of fifteen and twenty; the Young People of the *Hitler-Jugend* (*das deutsche Jungvolk der Hitler-Jugend der Bund des deutschen Jungen*) which admits boys between ten and fifteen; Association of German Girls (*Bund deutscher Mädel*); and the National Socialist Youth Works Cells (*Nationalsozialistische Jugendbetriebszellen*) for the younger industrial workers.⁸² The *Hitler-Jugend* is apparently a sort of glorified boy-scout body, organized on a military basis, with a special uniform and all the various insignia of rank, and is devoted to realizing Hitler's aim that "the young German must regain his faith in the invincibility of his whole people through physical strength and health."⁸³ The children are not only scientifically taught to play soldiers, but play with a deadly seriousness in order to fulfill their task as expressed in the charge given them: "Build yourself physically to be militant members of a militant people . . . Your youth service (*Jugenddienst*) is designed to prepare you to stake your lives for the existence of the Reich when the hour of battle strikes." It is estimated that already a million and a half boys and girls are enrolled in the *Hitler-Jugend*, almost every school in

the Reich having its *Hitler-Jugend* branch.

The SA (*Sturmabteilung*) and SS (*Schutzstaffel* or guard), Hitler's private army, are the most important of the Nazi organizations. They number more than two million⁸⁴ and are organized on a regular military basis from squads through brigades. Four brigades unite to form a so-called *Gruppe* (region), the *Gruppen* are in turn united in seven *Obergruppen* (superior regions) which now correspond exactly to the seven regional divisions of the *Reichswehr*.⁸⁵

ORGANIZATION OF THE SA⁸⁶

Groups	Number of Men
<i>Rotte</i> (Squad)	4-8
<i>Schar</i> (Platoon)	10-16
<i>Trupp</i> (Troop)	
composed of 3 <i>Scharen</i>	30-48
<i>Sturm</i> (Company)	150-250
<i>Sturmabteilung</i> (Battalion)	600-1,000
<i>Standarte</i> (Regiment)	3,000-3,500
<i>Brigade</i> (Division or Brigade) ..	10,000
<i>Gruppe</i> (Region)	40,000-100,000
<i>Obergruppe</i> (Super-regions as in the <i>Reichswehr</i>)

From its inception during the early days of the Nazi movement in Bavaria, moreover, the SA has had close connections with the *Reichswehr* through Captain Roehm, its present Chief of Staff and now Minister without Portfolio in the Reich government as well.⁸⁷

The Storm Troops possess an aviation escadrille in the Nazi *Luftsportsverband* (Air Sports Union) and *Luftschutzbund* (Air Protection League), both under the aegis of General Goering. The Air Sports Union is an unofficial organization designed to train pilots and operates throughout the Reich, which has been divided into fourteen aviation regions, two for each storm troop *Obergruppe*. At least one flying school is situated in each region where the SA fliers receive complete instruction in flying and aerial warfare from war aces and veteran commercial pilots. The Air Protection League, on the other hand, is designed not

84. According to a statement by Chief of Staff of the SA, Ernst Roehm, there were 2,000,000 Storm Troopers in October 1933 (*Voelkischer Beobachter*, October 5, 1933); on December 7 Roehm told foreign correspondants in Berlin that the SA numbered 2,500,000 (*New York Times*, December 8, 1933).

85.

REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS

S.A.*	Reichswehr**
I. Königsberg	Königsberg
II. Stettin	Stettin
III. Berlin	Berlin
IV. Dresden	Dresden
V. Frankfurt a/M	Stuttgart
VI. Hanover	Münster
VII. Munich	Munich
VIII. Austria	

*Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1934, cited, p. 158 et seq.

**Müller-Jabusch, *Handbuch des Öffentlichen Lebens*, 5th edition, Leipzig, Koehler Verlag, 1929, p. 111 et seq. The SA and *Reichswehr* divisions included under these regional headquarters correspond exactly with one another even in the two cases where the headquarters are in different cities.

86. *Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1934*, cited, p. 157 et seq.; Stowe, *Nazi Means War*, cited, p. 20 et seq.

87. Cf. the autobiography of Captain Ernst Roehm, *Die Geschichte eines Hochverrätters* (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1933, 4th edition), for a history of the SA, especially its connection with the *Freikorps* movement in Bavaria and with the *Reichswehr*.

79. Leland Stowe, *Nazi Means War* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1934), p. 40 et seq.; *The Times* (London), January 24, 1934.

80. Bruno Malitz, *Die Leibesübungen in der nationalsozialistischen Idee*, No. 46 in *Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek* (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1933, No. 17).

81. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

82. *Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch 1934*, Hrsg. unter Mitwirkung der Reichsleitung der N.S.D.A.P., 8th year (Munich, Eher Verlag, 1933), p. 181.

83. Quoted by the Reich Youth Leader, Baldur von Schirach, in the introduction to *Deutscher Jugenddienst* (Potsdam, Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag, 1933). This handbook is the official guide for all National Socialist youth organizations.

only to make the Germans air-minded but also to teach them how to defend themselves against air-raids.⁸⁸

PHYSICAL RE-ARMAMENT?

While it appears that the Reich's large potential man-power is being prepared for service, the extent to which this army has already been physically re-armed is difficult to determine. According to articles based on the French *dossier* of alleged German re-armament, the German rulers have almost completed the reorganization for war of the entire industrial, material and human resources of the Reich.⁸⁹ The strength of the *Reichswehr*, furthermore, is alleged to have been augmented from the 100,000 men allowed by the Treaty to 165,000, and all the combatant branches have been reformed and strengthened both as to numbers and equipment. Thorough mechanization of all arms of the service has taken place, and the *Reichswehr* now apparently constitutes an excellently equipped and trained nucleus for a large army. A large portion of the police, moreover, are alleged to have been transformed into highly potential military effectives who with the *Reichswehr* may be considered as the regular and non-commissioned officers of a future German fighting force for which the Storm Troopers and labor

corps will provide an immense reservoir of at least partially trained reserves.⁹⁰

The question immediately arises as to the arms, ammunition and equipment available for this potential army. While the industrial preparations for war are admittedly difficult to prove, the stock quotations of certain German firms believed to specialize in armament manufacture have risen considerably during the past year. Thus it is reported that in 1932 shares of the Berlin Karlsruher Industrie Werke varied from 16 to 58, while in 1933 they were quoted between 55 and 95.⁹¹ In the same way, stock of the Bayerische Motoren Werke, manufacturers of airplane engines and trench-mortars, ranged from 28 to 64 in 1932; during 1933 it varied between 67 and 140. The I. G. Chemical combine was listed in 1932 at between 81 and 108, and in 1933 its range was 95 to 148. Finally, the Rheinmetall Company, although it paid no dividends in 1929, is now paying its stockholders.⁹²

Besides the recent rise in the stock values of these important industries, the greatly increased importation by the Reich of certain raw materials which possess particular value for war purposes has caused added uneasiness abroad. Copper, cotton, nickel, manganese, iron, aluminum, wood and wood-pulp⁹³ are cited as outstanding examples of this trend.

CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of the Third Reich thus comprises conflicting elements. In speeches delivered since he came to power, Hitler has professed peace and abhorrence of war, in direct contradiction to his earlier statements. He has also given some proof of the sincerity of his pacifist protestations by concluding a Polish-German non-aggression pact and by offering to sign similar agreements with all Germany's neighbors. The Third Reich's foreign relations, however, have been complicated and injured by efforts, directed from Berlin, to Nazify German minorities living within the borders of these neighboring states.

The same paradox appears in the disarmament situation. While denying warlike aims, Nazi Germany is rapidly proceeding with thorough militarization of the German people. There would seem to be considerable

evidence also that physical re-armament of the Reich has already far exceeded the limits laid down by the Versailles Treaty. International disarmament negotiations have, meanwhile, reached a complete deadlock.

The world is confronted by a difficult choice. Is the Hitler government sincere? Should its pacific intentions be trusted despite existing evidence of Germany's moral, if not physical, re-armament? If these questions are to be answered in the affirmative, the heavily armed powers should take steps to reduce armaments, and rely on general international supervision to secure fulfillment of the Disarmament Convention by Germany and other nations. If the peaceful aims of the Hitler government are not to be trusted, the alternative may be a renewed arms race, ending eventually in war.

88. Stowe, *Nazi Means War*, cited, p. 60 et seq.

89. *The Times* (London), December 15, 16, 1933; *Le Temps*, November 10, 11, 17, 18, 1933.

90. The French estimate the present number of available German effectives entirely or partially trained at 1,345,000 as follows: *Reichswehr* 165,000; "time-expired" *Reichswehr* 100,000; available police 80,000; Storm Troops and *Stahlhelm* 1,000,000. *The Times* (London), December 15, 1933.

91. These quotations are taken from a summary of Berlin Bourse quotations (*Kursentwicklung der an der Berliner Börse variabel gehandelten Aktien*) published by the Berliner-Handelsgesellschaft.

92. *The Times* (London), December 15, 1933.

93. The import of wood and chemical wood-pulp, which are important elements in the manufacture of explosives, increased 123 per cent in 1933 as compared with 1932 according to the official *Voelkischer Beobachter*, January 8, 1934. It should be noted that due to the coordination of the German press, the demand for print paper decreased materially in the Reich during 1933.